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Sham Litigation in Zoning Challenges: Finding the Balance Between Protection of 
Constitutional Rights and Anti-competitive Business Practices 
 
Brian Lanyon 
 
Introduction: Anti-competitive Zoning Challenges  
Zoning developed out of the common law doctrine of nuisance.1  The primary purpose of 
zoning is to limit nuisances by organizing communities so that compatible uses are located in 
appropriate areas.2  Each municipality has a comprehensive plan, which “does not regulate or 
control the particular use of property; instead, a comprehensive plan sets goals for the 
development or redevelopment of a community.”3  Guided by its comprehensive plan, a 
municipality enacts a zoning ordinance that geographically divides the municipality into 
particular use districts (i.e. residential, commercial, industrial), though the ordinance can further 
limit uses within these district.4  For example, one commercial use district may allow “retail 
stores, hotels, clinics, broadcasting studios, garages, and other similar uses,” while another 
commercial use district allows for other types of business.5  In the municipality’s zoning 
ordinance, a zone can also be drawn to restrict certain categories of businesses such as industrial 
and heavy commercial or adult businesses from specific locations.6  An ordinance can regulate 
the types of businesses in each area, however, it cannot regulate the individual businesses 
themselves.  In other words, it is not appropriate for boards to selectively pick and choose one 
business over another, if both are allowable.  These actions would potentially lead to favoritism 
                                                          
1 Beverly J. Pooley, Planning and Zoning in the United States 40 (The University of Michigan 1961). 
2 Id. at 45 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926) “[W]ith the great increase and 
concentration of population, problems have developed, and constantly are developing, which require, and will 
continue to require, additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private lands in urban 
communities… In a changing world, it is impossible that it should be otherwise.”). 
3 Ronald S. Cope, The Zoning and Land Use Handbook 5 (American Bar Association 2016). 
4 Id. at 17. 
5 Id. at 18. 
6 Id. at 6. 
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and at a minimum the appearance of arbitrary decisions, which reduces public confidence in the 
zoning board. 
Anti-competitive zoning challenges can arise in any industry where the potential addition 
of a nearby competitor poses a threat to the profitability of an existing business owner.  This 
practice is common, especially between supermarkets.7  For example, Supermarket A, or the 
developer of its future store, seeks approval from municipal boards and various permits in order 
to develop the new location.  Supermarket B, a nearby grocery store, has a financial interest in 
preventing the new development project or, at a minimum, delaying the project for as long as 
possible.  A significant delay might have the same effect as preventing the new development 
since the market might change or the future lessee might find another location, causing the 
developer to lose the entire project. 
In rare cases, a developer might discover explicit evidence that the challenger’s sole 
desire is to challenge a future competitor’s entry into the market.  However, it is more likely that 
the challenge is disguised under otherwise legitimate complaints.  A challenger can oppose and 
delay a project in two primary ways: court challenges and permit challenges.  Prior to building, 
developers need zoning variance approvals, which are challenged through the courts.  
Developers also need building permits and other approvals from local administrative bodies, 
which are opposed through permit challenges.8  There are numerous times at which a challenger 
can oppose a project, which is how challenges can accumulate to cause significant delay.  The 
challengers may oppose the developer’s variance approval on the basis of traffic flow, parking 
                                                          
7 Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 175 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
2451(2016) (noting that supermarkets are an example of “an industry notorious for low profit margins, perhaps it is 
not surprising that this [case] is just the latest in a series of cases in which a supermarket allegedly employed 
anticompetitive tactics to keep a competitor out of the market.”). 
8 Myers, Gary. Litigation as a Predatory Practice, 80 Ky. L.J. 565, 593-94 (1992). 
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issues, landscaping compliance, lighting, and infrastructure demands. The challengers will also 
be able to oppose the building permits, environmental approvals, and other local discretionary 
approvals. 
It is important for courts to recognize the sham exception in zoning challenges in order to 
protect developers from the costly effects of baseless zoning challenges.  Courts should apply a 
more flexible standard when there is sufficient evidence to allege a pattern of baseless claims by 
the challenger. 
An entity can generally sue to challenge a zoning approval or permit unless the challenge 
is brought solely to prevent a competing business from obtaining approval.  This is the sham 
exception to the general rule allowing suits.  The sham exception allows the developer to 
counter-sue the challenger to receive compensation for lost profits caused by delays or 
dissolution of the development project due to the challenger’s baseless claims.  Baseless 
challenges brought by a competitor can impose significant costs on a prospective developer.  
Redevelopment projects are extensive and costly ventures that typically require multiple 
appearances in front of the municipality’s zoning board for variance approvals, as well as the use 
of experts to create plans for the development site.9  There are costs associated with the 
attorney’s fees for appearing at numerous hearings before the municipality’s zoning board and 
for responding to the petitioner’s appeal of a zoning approval.  Additionally, challengers who 
have this anti-competitive strategy typically challenge every part of the development application 
process, including permit approvals.10  These challenges may lead to various changes in the site 
plan.  The site plan is a comprehensive drawing of the development lot and includes elevations, 
                                                          
9 See generally, American Planning Association, Growing Smart Guidebook: Chapter 8 (part 2) Local Land 
Development Regulation, 8-302 Site Plan Review. https://www.planning.org/growingsmart/guidebook/ 
eight02.htm#8302 (last visited Mar. 2, 2018).  
10 See generally, Myers, Gary. Litigation as a Predatory Practice, 80 Ky. L.J. 565, 594-95 (1992). 
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architectural features, landscaping, and other engineering plans.11  It typically must include all 
necessary items required to explain elements of the project under review.12  To create the site 
plan, a developer must engage numerous costly experts including an architect, engineer, traffic 
planner, and environmental expert. 
Delays to the project can be expensive or even cause the development project to be 
terminated.13  Frequently, sites targeted for redevelopment are vacant when the developer is 
seeking approval. Therefore, any delay to the project results in the developer’s inability to collect 
rents.  This situation may be made worse if the developer is required to make mortgage payments 
on the property.  Additionally, significant delays could be destructive to the project since 
redevelopment projects are often sensitive to market conditions, changes of which could cause 
the economics of the project to worsen and make development no longer financially viable.  The 
developer may also lose the prospective tenant to a nearby location as the tenant may not be 
willing to wait for several years before moving to the newly developed site.14  Finally, courts 
have an interest in preventing overcrowded dockets, especially when claims are baseless.  
 Landmarks Holding Corp. v. Bermant15 is a prime example of sham litigation.  In 
Bermant, real estate developers sought approval for a shopping center in Hamden, Connecticut 
and claimed that two existing shopping centers conspired against their approval.16  In order to 
delay the approval, the two existing shopping centers filed “fourteen (mostly baseless) lawsuits, 
multiple appeals from adverse decisions, [appeared] at zoning hearings, [and employed] 
                                                          
11 American Planning Association, supra note 9.  
12 American Planning Association, supra note 9. 
13 Myers, supra, note 8, at 594. 
14 See e.g., Main St. at Woolwich v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc., 451 N.J. Super 135, 152 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2017). 
15 Landmarks Holding Corp. v. Bermant, 664 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1981). 
16 Id. at 892. 
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litigation delaying tactics and [a] massive publicity campaign[].”17  Even if the challenger 
business owners lost their petitions, they believed they could delay development of the 
competing property for a minimum of three to five years.18  One of the owners of the existing 
shopping centers admitted in a deposition that they “decided to oppose [the proposal] with every 
means, to either defeat or delay [it] for as many years as possible.”19  In Bermant, the court of 
appeals ruled for the developer and reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on 
the sham litigation claim.20  It held that these sham petitions were not protected by the First 
Amendment and remanded the case to the district court.21  This case may seem like an obvious 
example of the sham exception due to the evidence of intended baseless litigation during the 
deposition, but these occurrences are common.22  While this type of behavior is extreme, it 
shows how competitors can use “the courtroom as a sword to deter entry into a market.”23   
This note is organized as follows.  Part I will discuss the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and 
the sham litigation exception as it applies to zoning challenges.  Part II will discuss the factors 
that courts use to determine whether the sham litigation exception applies including an analysis 
of the Third Circuit Court’s decision in Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc24 
and the Superior Court of New Jersey’s recent decision in Main Street at Woolwich, LLC. v. 
Ammons Supermarket, Inc.25  Part III will discuss how courts should analyze these decisions and 
the importance of finding standing in these types of cases.  
 
                                                          
17 Myers, supra, note 8, at 594-95. 
18 Bermant, 664 F.2d at 892 (1981). 
19 Id. at 898. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Myers, supra, note 8, at 594-95. 
23 Id. 
24 Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2015). 
25 Main St. at Woolwich v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc., 451 N.J. Super 135 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017). 
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I. Background: Noerr-Pennington Doctrine and Sham Litigation Exception Applied to 
Zoning Challenges 
This section will discuss the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which describes the general right 
to bring suit, and the reasoning behind its application.  It will then discuss the sham litigation 
exception to the doctrine and the importance of this exception in zoning challenges, which is to 
combat baseless challenges that are used to delay the real estate development of a competitor. 
A. Anti-competitive Behavior is Not Permitted 
In general, any business can legally oppose a decision by the zoning board to grant a site 
plan approval or challenge the grant of a permit, unless the challenge has no legitimate basis 
other than to deter the entry of a competitor into the market.  
The First Amendment of the Constitution broadly gives citizens the right “to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”26  The First Amendment protects the foundation of a 
representative democracy by giving its citizens the right to “communicate their desires, 
anticompetitvely motivated or otherwise, to government officials.”27  However, court and permit 
challenges are not protected by antitrust law when a party solely intends to use the government 
for an anti-competitive outcome.28 
Anti-competitive practices are prohibited under the Sherman Act and Clayton Act, which 
both restrict antitrust behavior. The Sherman Act prohibits any attempt “to monopolize any part 
of the trade or commerce.”29  The Clayton Act defines a party eligible to bring a suit as “any 
person who [is] injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the 
                                                          
26 U.S. CONST. amend I. 
27 Lao, Marina, Reforming the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity Doctrine, 55 Rutgers L. Rev. 965, 966 (2003). 
28 Id. 
29 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
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antitrust laws.”30  The broad language of the Clayton Act demonstrates Congress’s intent to 
“create a private enforcement mechanism that would deter violators and deprive them of the 
fruits of their illegal actions, and would provide ample compensation to the victims of antitrust 
violations.”31  In order to satisfy the antitrust requirements of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the 
party must be a consumer or competitor in the restrained market.32  Additionally, the acts can be 
utilized by “those whose injuries are the means by which the defendants seek to achieve their 
anti-competitive ends.”33  In these cases, real estate developers are the entities that the defendants 
seek to harm in order to delay the future competitor-tenant. 
B. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine Provides Immunity from Antitrust Liability for Parties Who 
Petition the Government 
 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine limits the Sherman and Clayton Acts’ reach by relying on 
the guarantees provided by the First Amendment.34  The doctrine derives its name from two 
United States Supreme Court cases: Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor 
Freight, Inc.35 and United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington.36  Generally, the doctrine 
declares that petitioners for government redress are immune from antitrust liability unless their 
action falls under the “sham exception” because it is objectively baseless.37  Under the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine, a lawsuit is considered objectively baseless “if no reasonable litigant could 
realistically expect success on the merits.”38  It provides immunity to those who petition for 
redress of their grievances to a variety of government bodies, including administrative agencies, 
                                                          
30 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).  
31 Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 171 (3d Cir. 2015). 
32 Id. at 172.  
33 Id.  
34 Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 56 (1993).  
35 Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
36 United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
37 Prof’l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60. 
38 Ann K. Wooster, Application of Noerr-Pennington Doctrine by State Courts, 94 A.L.R. 5th 455, §3. 
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legislatures, executives, or the judiciary.39  The doctrine has its foundations in antitrust law, but it 
has been extended to support challengers who object to zoning applications since these 
challenges are petitions to government bodies recognized by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.40  
“The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine is not limited to federal antitrust actions… and may be invoked 
in other actions under state and federal law to protect the First Amendment right to petition the 
government.”41  It has also been applied to protect against “common-law torts such as malicious 
prosecution and abuse of process,”42 which are frequently the legal basis of claims brought in 
state courts by developers in response to the challenger’s objectively baseless opposition of their 
land development application.43 
 However, in Noerr, the Supreme Court recognized that there may be instances where the 
petition “is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere 
directly with the business relationships of a competitor.”44  These instances justify applying the 
Sherman Act.45  The sham exception exists to remove protection from meritless claims and 
ensures that Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not give petitioners an unchecked right to challenge 
competitors.46 
C. Sham Litigation as an Exception to Noerr-Pennington 
 The prototypical example of sham litigation “is the filing of frivolous objections to the 
license application of a competitor, with no expectation of achieving denial of the license, but 
                                                          
39 Id. at §2[a]. 
40 Main St. at Woolwich v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc., 451 N.J. Super 135, 144 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017). 
41 Wooster, supra note 38, at §11-3. 
42 Woolwich, 451 N.J. Super at 144 (2017). 
43 See e.g., Alfred Weissman Real Estate, Inc. v. Big V. Supermarkets, Inc., 268 A.D.2d 101, 105-06 (App. Div. 
2000) (Suing for “(1) tortious interference with a contract, (2) tortious interference with prospective economic 
advantage . . .”); Main St. at Woolwich v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc., 451 N.J. Super 135, 144 (Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2017) (Suing for “malicious abuse of process, tortious interference with prospective business contracts, and 
civil conspiracy.”). 
44 Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961). 
45 Id. 
46 See generally, Prof’l Real Estate Investors. Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993). 
 9 
simply in order to impose expense and delay.”47  The presumption of immunity under the 
doctrine is nullified when the challenger brings a frivolous claim that is considered sham 
litigation.48 
 In the zoning approval context, “[o]bjectors to land use applications are immune from tort 
liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine unless the conduct at issue is a mere sham to cover 
. . . an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor.”49  First 
Amendment protection is forfeited when the zoning challenge lacks the genuine and legitimate 
purpose of receiving a favorable decision by the government body.50  The court first looks at 
whether the challenger has filed one or numerous filings.51  This is done to determine whether 
the challenge has a legitimate basis or whether the filing is a disguised attempt to directly 
interfere with the business practices of a competitor.52 
 When courts decide whether a petition is sham litigation, a primary consideration should 
be whether there is a pattern of baseless claims against the application for an individual 
development project. In California Motors, the Supreme Court discussed how a pattern of sham 
litigation abuses the judicial process by unnecessarily overloading court dockets with baseless 
challenges.53  In this way, sham challenges could be effectively wielded to restrain competition. 
This is because one claim may go unnoticed or receive leniency by a court, but “a pattern of 
baseless, repetitive claims may emerge which leads the factfinder to conclude that the 
administrative and judicial processes have been abused.”54  It may be difficult to determine how 
                                                          
47 Wooster, supra note 38, at §5[b]. 
48 Prof’l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60-61. 
49 Main St. at Woolwich v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc., 451 N.J. Super 135, 144 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017). 
50 Wooster, supra note 38, at §3. 
51 Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 180 (3d Cir. 2015). 
52 Id. 
53 CA Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972).  
54 Id. 
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many baseless claims are needed or how to distinguish between what behavior is objectively 
baseless when the anti-competitive challenge is not overt.55  The determination may be difficult, 
but once the court establishes that abuse of the judicial process has led to an illegal result, it 
should effectively bar petitioners from access to the courts and the municipal boards overseeing 
the zoning decision.56   
When the court determines the challenges are objectively baseless and fall under the 
sham exception, a challenger’s First Amendment rights are no longer protected since they have 
been abused. Further, the Ninth Circuit has held that, “[w]hen dealing with a series of lawsuits, 
the question is not whether any one of them has merit . . . but whether they are brought pursuant 
to a policy of starting legal proceedings without regard to the merits and for the purpose of 
injuring a market rival.”57 The challenger’s appeals need to be viewed on the whole and one 
successful challenge does not support numerous baseless challenges.58 
In Hanover Realty, the Third Circuit detailed the distinction between the standards 
applied in California Motor and Professional Real Estate.59  Even though these two tests provide 
similar explanations of the sham exception, the analysis of sham litigation should be applied 
differently depending on the number of sham petitions filed by the petitioner with regard to the 
subject property of the litigation.60 
 
                                                          
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 USS-Posco Indus. V. Contra Costa Cty. Bldg., 31 F. 3d 800, 801 (9th Cir. 1994). 
58 Prof’l Real Estate Investors. Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. 508 U.S. 49, 73 (1993) (concurring, J. Stevens 
stating “[r]epetitive findings, some of which are successful and some unsuccessful, may support an inference that 
the process is being misused.”). 
59 Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 179-80 (3d Cir. 2015). 
60 Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 179-80 (“Three other Courts of Appeals have reconciled California Motor and 
Professional Real Estate by concluding that they apply in different situations: California Motors to a series of sham 
petitions and Professional Real Estate to a single sham petition.”). 
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D. Analysis When There is a Single Sham Petition 
 When it is alleged that the defendant engaged in a single or limited number of sham 
petitions, the two-part test set forth in Professional Real Estate should apply to determine if the 
sham litigation exception applies. “First, the lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense 
that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.”61  Second, it must be 
brought as “an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor,62 
through the use of the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process—as an 
anticompetitve weapon.”63  This test should apply when there is evidence of sham litigation 
regarding a single suit or legal appeal by the challenging party.64  Part two of the test can 
otherwise be stated that the applicant is “subjectively motivated by bad faith.”65  Further, “[i]f an 
objective litigant could conclude that the suit is reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable 
outcome, the suit is immunized under Neorr.”66  Only after the challenged litigation is 
determined to be objectively meritless will the court receive the litigants subjective motivation 
under the second prong.67 Because there is only one or a limited number of challenges, the 
analysis is more strict than if there is evidence of numerous filings, which is more likely to 
indicate sham litigation.  Courts have reasoned that “with only one ‘data point’ it is difficult to 
determine with any precision whether the petition was anticompetitive.”68  It is also possible that 
courts may be unwilling to limit First Amendment protections when a single suit is filed against 
the developer. 
                                                          
61 Prof’l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60. 
62 Id. 
63 Prof’l Real Estate Investors. Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993). 
64 Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 180 (3d Cir. 2015). 
65 Wooster, supra note 38, at §3. 
66 Prof’l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60. 
67 Id. at 60-61. 
68 Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 180. 
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E. Analysis When There is a Series of Sham Petitions  
The standard in California Motor Transport should apply when the defendant files 
numerous challenges or legal proceedings with regard to the prospective development project.69 
There is no required number of petitions needed to apply the California Motor Transport 
analysis rather than the Professional Real Estate test.70  The Court held that the complaint 
sufficiently alleged a sham litigation since the aggrieved party claimed that the challengers 
“sought to bar their competitors from meaningful access to adjudicatory tribunals and so to usurp 
that decision-making process.”71 Additionally, the affected party alleged that the “petitioners 
instituted the proceedings and actions with or without probable cause, and regardless of the 
merits of the case.”72  The Ninth Circuit discussed that California Motor Transport “recognized 
that the filing of a whole series of lawsuits and other legal actions without regard to the merits 
has far more serious implications than filing a single action.”73  This standard triggers a fluid 
review weighing the facts of the case, in comparison to the strict two-part test in Professional 
Real Estate.74 
 When reviewing cases where a challenger has brought multiple lawsuits or attempts to 
delay the developer’s project, “the question is not whether any one of them has merit . . .  but 
whether they are brought pursuant to a policy of starting legal proceedings without regard to the 
merits and for the purpose of injuring a market rival.”75  The review is prospective and considers 
whether the numerous filings were intended to harass the developer.76  In order to determine if 
                                                          
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 180-81. 
71 CA Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512 (1972). 
72 Id. 
73 USS-Posco Indus. V. Contra Costa Cty. Bldg., 31 F. 3d 800, 811 (9th Cir. 1994). 
74 Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 181 (3d Cir. 2015). 
75 Id. at 180. 
76 Id. at 181. 
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the filings were without merit, the court must look at all the facts and circumstances of the 
case.77  The court “should perform a holistic review that may include looking at the defendants 
filing status (i.e. win-loss percentage) as circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s subjective 
motivations.”78  Included in these considerations should be evidence of bad-faith, as well as the 
magnitude and nature of the harm caused by the challenger’s petitioning activity.79  The court 
must weigh the wins and losses for each side since the challenger may succeed on some 
proceedings simply as a matter of chance.80  In other words, “[t]he fact that there may be 
moments of merit within a series of lawsuits is not inconsistent with a campaign of sham 
litigation.”81   
 The sham exception is still considerably narrow as courts are often worried about 
infringing on a petitioner’s right to bring a claim before the courts.82  The exception frequently 
involves complicated questions of fact and the burden is on the party “opposing [the] application 
of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to prove that the [challenger] comes within the sham 
exception.”83  Further, it is complicated by the fact that more is needed to prove sham litigation 
than anti-competitive intent.84 
 
 
 
                                                          
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 181 (3d Cir. 2015). 
80 Id. at 179-80. 
81 Id. at 182. 
82 Wooster, supra note 38, at §5[b]. 
83 Wooster, supra note 38, at §5[b]. 
84 Alfred Weissman Real Estate, Inc. v. Big V. Supermarkets, Inc., 268 A.D.2d 101, 107-108 (App. Div. 2000) 
(stating “[c]itizens who petition for governmental action favorable to them cannot be prosecuted under the antitrust 
laws, even though their petitions are motivated by anticompetitive intent.”). 
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II.  Applying the Standard in Recent Decisions 
Part II will discuss the Third Circuit’s analysis in Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. Vill. 
Supermarkets, Inc. and review how this reasoning was applied by the Superior Court of New 
Jersey in Main St. at Woolwich, LLC v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc. 
A. Third Circuit’s analysis in the Hanover Realty 
In Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., a developer sought zoning 
approval to improve its property with a commercial building that would be occupied by a 
Wegmans85 supermarket.86  The owner of a nearby ShopRite87 supermarket filed numerous 
administrative and court challenges to the developer’s permit applications.88  In response, the 
developer sued the challenger, the ShopRite group, alleging violations of the Sherman Act; they 
argued that the petitioner’s filings were baseless since they were only an attempt to stop the entry 
of a competitor into their market.89 
These cases can become complicated because the challenger’s actions impact the 
developer, who is not necessarily a direct competitor.  The challenger is typically a supermarket 
and the ownership group that owns the numerous supermarkets,90 whereas the aggrieved party is 
a real estate developer.  The prospective tenant at the newly developed location—in this case 
Wegmans—may not want to be involved in the sham litigation lawsuit.91  Therefore, some anti-
                                                          
85 Wegmans is a supermarket chain based out the of the Northeast with ninety-five locations in Maryland, Virginia, 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, and Massachusetts. WEGMANS, https://www.wegmans.com/ about-
us/company-overview.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2017).  
86 Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 167 (3d Cir. 2015). 
87 ShopRite is a cooperative with fifty members “who individually own and operate under the ShopRite banner.” 
The company has locations throughout the Northeast in Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, 
and Connecticut. SHOPRITE, http://www.shoprite.com/about-us/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2017).  
88 Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 167. 
89 Id. 
90 In Hanover Realty, the defendants “owned twenty-six ShopRites in New Jersey including one in Hanover about 
two miles from the site of the proposed Wegmans. Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 168. 
91 Wegman’s “site development agreement placed the burden on Hanover Realty to obtain all necessary 
governmental permits prior to beginning construction. If Hanover Realty was unable to secure the required permits 
within two years of the agreement, Wegmans could walk away from the deal.” Hanover Realty, 806 F.3d at 168. 
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competitive claims do not survive the question of standing.  In Hanover Realty, the Third Circuit 
held that Hanover Realty did not have standing for a “claim for the attempted monopolization of 
the market for rental space” because Hanover Realty does not compete with ShopRite in that 
market.92  However, this did not eliminate the possibility that the developer could seek legal 
action against ShopRite for anti-competitive behavior.  The court stated that “[t]he end goal of 
[ShopRite’s] alleged anticompetitive conduct was to injure Wegmans, a prospective 
competitor.”93  However, to keep Wegmans from entering their market, two miles from their 
ShopRite location, the challengers sought to impose costs on the developer of the property, and 
not directly on Wegmans.94  This is because the developer was the party who needed to obtain 
the appropriate approvals and permits before beginning construction of the new development.95  
“[I]njuring Hanover Realty was the very means by which the defendants could get to Wegmans” 
thus ShopRite is trying to remove themselves from liability on a technicality.96  Therefore, 
“Hanover can establish that its injury was ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the defendant’s 
anticompetitive conduct” and thus have standing to sue the defendants.97 
 After realizing that Wegmans would be leasing commercial space at the proposed 
development site and entering their market, ShopRite filed numerous administrative and court 
challenges to Hanover Realty’s applications.98  This “petitioning campaign was designed to 
block Hanover Realty from obtaining the permits and approvals it needed to proceed with the 
project.”99   
                                                          
92 Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC. v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 167 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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The challengers appealed Hanover Realty’s project in four major phases.  First, they 
sought to vacate the Flood Hazard Area Permit already granted to Hanover Realty.100  However, 
their claim was dismissed because their “general property rights” and claim of “greater 
competition” from the proposed site was not sufficient to prove they were an aggrieved party.101  
Second, the challengers hired an ecological consultant to submit a letter on their behalf opposing 
the granting of various wetlands permits from the New Jersey Environmental Department.102  In 
an email, the ecological consulting firm was proud of its ability to “delay the issuance of the 
Wetlands approvals based on a technicality” and that its additional objections may be able to 
further delay the project.103  Ultimately, the Environmental Department issued the Wetlands 
permit, but it was subject to various conditions including one that required the developers to 
survey the property for the presence of Indiana bats104 prior to construction, a condition with 
which the developers ultimately had to comply.105  Third, the challengers submitted a letter to the 
Department of Transportation (“DOT”) objecting to Hanover Realty’s application for a street 
permit, which contained road improvement conditions in the development agreement.106  The 
DOT stated that Hanover Realty would need additional improvements after it considered all 
relevant data and arguments submitted by third parties.107  The final formal objection was that 
the challengers filed an action in New Jersey State Court seeking to nullify the Zoning Board’s 
site plan approval. 108  The New Jersey State Court dismissed the challengers’ claim both on the 
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standing issue and also on the merits of the case.109  This objection was perhaps the most telling 
of subjective evidence of bad faith, because the challenger did not have any objections to 
Hanover Realty’s application to rezone the property for retail use until after the Zoning Board 
approved the site plan.110  At this point, the challenger likely knew that a Wegmans supermarket 
would be occupying the new retail development. 
The time sensitive nature of these approvals is shown by that fact that the development 
contract between Hanover Realty and their prospective tenant, Wegmans, included a provision 
that if “Hanover Realty was unable to secure the required permits within two years of the 
agreement, Wegmans could walk away from the deal.”111  
The Third Circuit reconciled California Motor Transport and Professional Real Estate 
“by concluding that they apply to different situations: California Motor Transport applies to a 
series of sham petitions and Professional Real Estate applies to a single sham petition.”112  Here, 
since the ShopRite group filed four challenges with numerous sub-challenges against the 
developer, the more holistic and less strict review under California Motor Transport should 
apply.113  Hanover Realty can establish that the ShopRite group filed a pattern of objectively 
baseless administrative and court challenges to the developer’s project.114  Even though the 
challenger succeeded on parts of their challenges to the Environmental Department and DOT, 
“the fact that there may be moments of merit within a series of lawsuits in not inconsistent with a 
campaign of sham litigation.”115  Further, the court looked at the subjective intent of the 
challengers and stated that they have not “articulated any genuine interest in flooding or traffic 
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near the proposed Wegmans, which is two miles from ShopRite, or in protecting the Indiana 
bat.”116  Therefore, there are sufficient facts to conclude that the ShopRite group may have 
engaged in a pattern of sham litigation and would be not entitled to protection under the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine.117 The court did not discuss potential damages, but in Hanover’s brief to the 
district court they stated that their damages included “lost rent, increased expenses and carrying 
changes and diminution of value resulting from [Shop Rite’s] sham petitioning.”118 
Also, it is important to note the dissent in this case because it may be difficult to find 
standing in these types of cases.  The dissent believed that Hanover Realty did not suffer an 
antitrust injury because it does not compete in the supermarket business with ShopRite.119  As 
the dissent noted, Hanover supplied commercial space to full-service supermarkets, but the 
market for grocery stores, and not the real property market, was the market that was allegedly 
restrained.120 
B. Standard as Applied in Woolwich 
 In Main Street at Woolwich, LLC. v. Ammons Supermarket, Inc., a developer owned a 
significant amount of land in Woolwich Township, which it planned to improve with a shopping 
center.121  In 2007, the developer, Woolwich, began the approval process to obtain government 
approval to develop the land.122  The process required approval from the New Jersey State 
Planning Committee and numerous approvals from the Woolwich Township Joint Land Use 
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Board.123  In 2010, the Woolwich Township Joint Land Use Board (“Board”) approved the 
developer’s general development plan (“GDP”), which permitted a project that allowed for 1.5 
million square feet of commercial and retail space to be developed in three phases.124  At this 
point it was unknown which stores would occupy the proposed development site.125  In April 
2012, the developer submitted an application for site plan approval to develop phase one of the 
project, which included a Wal-Mart.126  In October 2013, the Board approved the developer’s 
final site plan, which went unopposed.127 
 Following the Board’s approval, an owner of a nearby ShopRite challenged the approval 
for “improper change of the phasing dates of the Complex, inadequate water and sewer 
resources, improper addition of acreage to the parcel, violations of the Municipal Land Use Law 
(“MLUL”) . . . inadequate proof to support the variances and waivers, [and] failure to comply 
with notice requirements.”128  However, the challengers lost these zoning petitions and the 
developers filed a complaint against the challengers alleging malicious abuse of process, tortious 
interference, and civil conspiracy.129  Developers claimed the challengers’ filings amounted to 
sham litigation because they were intended solely to interfere with approval for the prospective 
supermarket.130  
 The New Jersey Superior Court held that there were sufficient facts alleged to suggest the 
challengers “engaged in sham litigation for the sole purpose of impeding the development of 
plaintiffs’ shopping center and to stifle competition.”131  The court adopted the holding of 
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Hanover Realty and concluded that “the motion judge was required to consider the allegations in 
the plaintiff’s complaint that the [challengers’] action was part of a pattern of sham litigation 
brought by defendants for the purpose of injuring market rivals rather than to redress actual 
grievances.”132 
 Under the California Motor standard, the court first reviewed the number of baseless and 
repetitive claims brought by the challengers.133  First, the court did not find support that the 
challengers’ original appeals raised real concerns about the validity of the Woolwich GDP 
ordinance.134  The challengers’ appeal of the Board’s determination was without merit and their 
challenge to the water and sewer issues was “not supported by the MLUL or the case law.”135  
Therefore, the developer had successfully defended against litigation brought by the 
defendants.136  In addition to challenging the development project at issue, the developer alleged 
that between the challengers themselves and their associated entity, Wakefern,137 the parties had 
“engaged in an extensive course of conduct, including sham litigation, to interfere with the 
development of supermarkets that would compete with ShopRite stores.”138  The developer’s 
allegation included a list of seventeen sites with which they claim the challenger and Wakefern 
had attempted to interfere.139  The list contained alleged challenges to projects across New Jersey 
for prospective sites for Wal-Mart, Stop & Shop, Aldi, Kings, and Wegmans Supermarkets.140  
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The court included the numerous alleged challenges of other sites in their analysis in addition to 
the multiple petitions against the subject property.141   
As the court noted in Hanover Realty, a holistic review including all the facts and 
circumstances should be performed.142  Therefore, in Woolwich, it may be relevant that there is 
specific evidence of anti-competitive behavior between the challengers and developer.  The court 
noted that while the challengers’ appeal was pending, the developer alleged that someone with a 
connection to the challenger called the developer’s representatives and “inquired whether 
plaintiffs would be willing to lease space at the [proposed] Complex to the [challengers].”143  If 
these allegations are true, it would provide additional evidence of anti-competitive behavior 
beyond the zoning appeals themselves. 
Applying the appropriate standard is especially important because the lower court found 
that the challengers’ actions to petition against “the GDP [were] protected by the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine and [were] not objectively baseless.”144  The New Jersey Superior Court 
noted that the motion judge misapplied the standard and provided no support for her conclusion 
that the challengers’ actions were not objectively baseless.145 
The developer brought the anti-competitive allegations of malicious abuse of process, 
tortious interference, and civil conspiracy after it successfully defended against the litigation 
brought by the challengers.146 Unlike Hanover Realty, the developer did not bring the case in 
federal court based on antitrust claims, but brought the case in state court with allegations of 
these common law tort violations.  However, the Noerr Pennington doctrine also applies to 
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common law tort claims brought in state court.147 The court noted the Fourth Circuit’s 
application of California Motor Transport in Waugh Chapel South, LLC. v. United Foods & 
Commercial Workers Union Local 27.148  The Fourth Circuit held that “the subjective motive of 
the litigant and objective merits of the suit are relevant, but other signs of bad-faith litigation . . . 
may also be probative of abuse of the adjudicatory process.”149  In this case, the court found 
sham litigation “where only one of fourteen proceedings were successful.”150 
C. Malicious Abuse of Process 
 Malicious abuse of process is a tort claim where “the misuse, or misapplying process 
justified in itself for an end other than that which it was designed to accomplish.”151  The 
developer must show that the challenger “performed further acts after the issuance of process 
which represents the perversion or abuse of the legitimate purposes of that process.”152 
 In Woolwich, the developer argued that filing an appeal of the developer’s approval and 
subsequently reaching out to a representative of the developer to lease the proposed space may 
be a sufficient “further act after the issuance of process.”153  Additionally, the challengers did not 
oppose the zoning approval until they discovered that a ShopRite competitor would be a tenant at 
the site.154  These two arguments undermine the challengers’ claim that they opposed the 
development “in good faith.”155 
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D. Tortious Interference 
 Tortious interference must “rest on facts plausibly supporting a conclusion that 
defendant’s actions were ‘improper’ or ‘wrongful.’”156  In order to determine whether either of 
these conditions were met, the court must evaluate “the nature of and motivation behind the 
conduct, the interest advanced and interfered with, societal interests that bear on the rights of 
each party, the proximate relationship between the conduct and interference, and the relationship 
between the parties.”157  Here, the court again looked at the timing of the challenges and noted 
that no appeals followed the original GDP approval.158  However, once it was identified that a 
Wal-Mart would be occupying the commercial space, the challengers hired a lawyer to appeal 
the second GDP approval.159 
This case—whose litigation ran for two and a half years—is another example of how 
zoning petitions can be an effective tool against a competitor, if left unchecked.160  The 
developers stated that during the pending litigation, “they were unable to proceed with the 
development of the property, could not enter into leases with prospective tenants, and lost 
credibility in the marketplace.”161 
There is a delicate balance between enacting stricter laws to stop anti-competitive zoning 
challenges and infringing on the First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of 
grievances.  Using a fact-sensitive, open-ended rule allowed the Woolwich court to review the 
fact that the challengers had filed numerous similar anti-competitive petitions across New Jersey.   
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III.  Conclusion 
A. Appropriate Analysis for Reviewing Sham Litigation in Zoning 
In Hanover Realty, the Third Circuit reconciled California Motor Transport and 
Professional Real Estate “by concluding that they apply to different situations: California Motor 
Transport applies to a series of sham petitions and Professional Real Estate applies to a single 
sham petition.”162  First, the court should determine whether the challenging party has issued one 
or a few filings against the prospective development or whether it has filed numerous meritless 
filings.163  Where there is only one alleged sham petition, Professional Real Estate’s more 
rigorous two-step test properly tilts the scale in favor of the defendant.164 Courts should be wary 
of limiting First Amendment freedom of speech protections when there is only one petition.  
Additionally, “with only one data point, it is difficult to determine with any precision whether 
the petition was anticompetitive.”165  However, when it is sufficiently alleged that the defendant 
interfered by filing a pattern of baseless appeals against the developer’s project, the more flexible 
application in California Motor Transport should apply.166  In this case, a court “should perform 
a holistic review that may include looking at the defendant’s filing status (i.e. win-loss 
percentage) as well as circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s subjective motivations.”167  
“Courts should consider evidence of bad-faith as well as the magnitude and the nature of the 
collateral harm imposed on the plaintiffs by the defendants’ petitioning activity (i.e. abuses of the 
discovery process and interference with access to governmental agencies).”168  Courts must also 
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be careful not to let a defendant’s campaign of sham litigation be overlooked if they win one or 
only a few challenges.169 
Further, in Woolwich, the New Jersey Superior Court highlighted evidence provided by 
the developer that the challenging party had conducted the same or similar anti-competitive 
actions in other projects.170  When determining if the challenger has engaged in a pattern of 
baseless claims, it may be relevant to include the challengers’ alleged sham litigations in other 
locations and not only the number of challenges filed in the case at issue. 
B. Standing Requirement 
We do not always get to a just result where an aggrieved party is made whole with a 
counter-suit because a developer may be shut out of court for lack of standing.  As the dissent in 
Hanover discusses, standing often keeps the developers from suing the parties who opposed 
numerous permits and court challenges delaying their development project.   There is irony in the 
fact that a party that weathered allegedly baseless court and administrative challenges is then 
shut out from appealing to the courts to make themselves whole for lost profits from the failed 
development project.  It is difficult enough that the developer lost the development project due to 
the expenses and delay imposed on the project by the challenger, but there should be an 
appropriate cause of action. 
The standing question is raised for cases in federal court because to have standing for an 
antitrust claim the party must be “injured in his business or property by anything forbidden in 
antitrust laws.”171  In Hanover, the court ruled that the developer had standing to sue because its 
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actions were “inextricably intertwined” with the challengers’ objectively baseless conduct 
intended to prohibit access by the prospective tenant.172  Defendants may look to bring an 
antitrust case in federal court because it is able to receive treble damages and reimbursement for 
the lawsuit’s cost, including attorney’s fees.173  However, if antitrust standing cannot be 
established in federal court, an alternative is to bring causes of action for tortious interference 
and malicious abuse of process through state courts.174 
The sham exception was created to allow for fair competition.  To combat these sham 
challenges that lead to an unfair outcome for the developers and overwhelm the court dockets 
with baseless claims, the more flexible standard outlined in Hanover Realty should be applied 
when there is sufficient evidence to allege a pattern of baseless claims by the challenger.   
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